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ABSTRACT
We study the effect of religiosity on the political choices over redistribution and the legal restric-
tions on personal liberties. We assume that the more religious an individual is, (i) the less he
enjoys the use of liberties prohibited by his religion; and (ii) the higher the negative externality
experienced when others practice those liberties. We show that legal restrictions on liberties has
an impact on income inequality. We find that when the religious cleavage in society is large, high
intolerance due to negative externalities leads to a political outcome consisting of repression of
liberties and relatively low taxes.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Religions typically establish codes of behaviour which include well-defined rules and attitudes
towards personal liberties and individual conduct ranging from gender roles, marriage, divorce
and sexual behaviour, to restrictions on alcohol, dressing, and food consumption. As Becker
(1996) points out, these norms are “internalized as preferences” and clearly influence individual
decisions.
In many countries, religious individuals and organizations advocate that religious norms are
regulated by law, so that they become mandatory for the whole population. The pressure to
formulate such laws suggests a powerful externality effect: religious individuals or organizations
may experience negative utility from the fact that others in society practice such liberties. Thus,
while lifting restrictions on personal liberties can broaden the choices of the less devout, it may
adversely affect the utility of the more religious.
Yet, the past fifty years have been recognized by historians as years of an on-going rights revo-
lution in developed countries (Hitchcock et al, 2012), where legal restrictions over personal de-
cisions have been substantially relaxed. A good example is the effect of the change in women’s
rights, namely the rights over their bodies and the lifting of restrictions on labor market partici-
pation. While the more permissive legal environment has allowed secular women to benefit from
more choices in terms of family planning and career opportunities, religious restrictions in those
areas may still constrain the more religious women.
In this paper we show how such religious preferences affect the political choice of the legal
limit of liberties. While the literature has extensively studied how religious restrictions affect
individual behaviour,3 our work is a first step in understanding how religious norms affect laws
regulating individual liberties in the wider society. As a motivation, the following plot illustrates
the cross-country correlation between the legal level of liberties and the country’s degree of
religiosity for the set of European countries studied in Esteban, Levy and Mayoral (2017). The
correlation between religious intensity and the Liberties index is -0.54 (see Appendix B for an
extensive discussion).
We also highlight that the political choice of the legal limit on individual liberties is inherently
linked to redistribution. Relaxing the legal regulation on individual liberties increases the choice
set of the less religious individuals, while the more religious ones continue to be bounded by their
own “moral” constraints. Moreover, the latter may suffer negative externalities. We show that
these two effects can explain why poor religious individuals may prefer restriction of liberties
along with low taxes, and how this can arise as a political outcome of a voting game.
The core argument is as follows. Relaxing the legal caps on liberties, for example, by autho-
rizing the consumption of certain goods (alcohol, meat, etc.), or by allowing for a larger set of
career and family planning choices, can incentivize secular individuals to work more relative to
individuals who are constrained by their religious values.4 As a result of the differential work
incentives, wider individual liberties will increase income inequality. Hence, the more secular
3Iannacconne (1992), Berman (2000), Carvalho and Koyama (2012) among many others.
4The result that religiosity is associated with lower effort or labor supply has been attested by abundant empirical
literature. Clark and Lelkes (2005), Berman (2000), Lehrer (1995), among others, find that religiosity has a negative
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This graph plots country-level religious
intensity for 34 European countries versus the Liberties Index, that captures the evolution of the regulation on issues such as
abortion, divorce, women’s rights, LGBT rights and euthanasia, for the period 2002–2012. A higher value of the Liberties Index
implies laxer regulation. See Appendix B for definitions of the variables and sources.
population will be in favor of broadening personal liberties together with a low income tax, as
their (relative) income goes up. The more religious individuals face a trade-off. When the legal
caps on liberties are relaxed, their religious beliefs make them relatively poor and, thus, their
desired tax level increases. But the more religious they are, the higher the negative externalities
they experience when others practice liberties. This makes them prefer to repress liberties and,
since repression of liberties reduces income inequality, they will also favor a lower tax rate.
We thus obtain that when intolerance to others practicing liberties is relatively large, very reli-
gious poor individuals prefer repression of liberties and modest redistribution. There are many
empirical papers establishing the link between religiosity and support for low taxes.5 But from
our results it follows that the right-wing positioning of poor religious individuals would not nec-
essarily be driven by a “forced choice” provoked by the specific policy mix of conservative
parties, as suggested, e.g., in Huber and Stanig (2007). Our results imply that such a mix is in
line with these voters’ preferences on the two dimensions.
We also analyze the outcome of a two-dimensional citizen-candidate model where politicians
offer a bundle of redistribution and the legal cap on liberties. We obtain that the political outcome
depends on which distribution has higher dispersion, the one over productivities or the one over
religiosity. When the productivity gap is wide relative to the religious gap, then low productive
effect on labor supply. At the aggregate level Barro and McCleary (2003) show that economic growth is negatively
related to church attendance. We also provide more evidence on this in Esteban, Levy and Mayoral (2017).
5See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), Stegmueller (2013) and De la O and Rodden (2008) who find that the
relative importance of economic over moral issues displayed by individual preferences is increasing with income, so
that poor individuals care more about “moral” issues. In our model it is religiosity which makes one poor.
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individuals can “collude” so that, even for intermediate levels of intolerance, liberties and high
taxation are the political outcomes in society. However, when the dispersion of religious beliefs
is high compared with that of productivity, such intolerance levels will yield a joint outcome
of repression of liberties along with lower taxes. Thus, while our first result illustrates that
individual preferences can be composed of a mix of low liberties and modest redistribution, our
second set of results shows that the political outcome itself can bundle restriction on liberties with
modest taxation. The result that the political outcome in more religious societies is associated
with lower taxes is consistent with the empirical evidence, as in Scheve and Stasavage (2006)
and Palani (2008), who show that more religious countries redistribute less.6
Our paper is related to the literature on religious restrictions or sacrifices; specifically, many
models in the literature show that religiosity and its restrictions on daily life, can decrease labour
effort relative to non-religious. These are the implications of the models of Iannaccone (1992),
Berman (2000), and Carvalho and Koyama (2012), who argue that religions strategically choose
restrictions on individual liberties to induce labour or capital contributions, or induce individuals
to participate in costly rituals and hence reduce their material productivity. As far as we know,
ours is the first paper that explores the implications of religious preferences over liberties on
society’s legal choices.
The nexus between religiosity and inherent preference for lower redistribution has been ex-
plained theoretically by several papers. Chen and Lind (2016), Ceyhun et al (2013) and Huber
and Stanig (2011) argue that the lower support for redistribution is caused by the preference for
social assistance and eventual redistribution within the own religious community. In Scheve and
Stasavage (2006) –see also Gill and Lansgaarde (2004) and Clark and Lelkes (2004)– the psychic
benefit from religion allows individuals to cope with bad states which nullifies the need for social
insurance and, hence, religious individuals prefer smaller governments. In Benabou and Tirole
(2006) religion is a way of manipulating one’s beliefs in order to motivate continued effort so that
religious individuals work harder and demand less taxes. Our model provides a complementary
explanation showing how religious restrictions on liberties affect the distribution of income and,
hence, preferences over taxation.
In terms of political choices, our model is related to the two-dimensional models exploring
choices of redistribution as well as other variables, such as targeted transfers or other benefits to
religious individuals. Roemer (1998) was the first to formalize the voting over redistribution and
religious provisions and to show that all parties may propose relatively moderate taxes as a result
of the two-dimensional competition. Levy (2004) analyzes a two-dimensional policy space, such
as general income redistribution and targeted redistribution, and shows that the rich individuals
may form a party with the religious poor that will reduce total taxation but target its revenue to
specific religious interests at the expense of general redistribution. A similar argument is made
by Huber and Stanig (2011) and Benabou et al (2015a, 2015b).
Our contribution with respect to this literature on two-dimensional voting is as follows. In all
the models considered above, the ideal policy of poor religious individuals will include religious
6Palani (2008) finds a positive and significant relationship between inequality measures (the Gini coefficient and
the ratio of top to bottom quantile) and the national average intensity of religiosity [obtained from surveys] using data
from 80 countries of all continents.
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provisions as well as high taxes. However, in our case, the political choice of the second di-
mension –the legal cap of personal liberties– is inherently tied to income inequality and taxation.
Religious individuals may prefer repression, and this will suppress work incentives and hence in-
come inequality. As a result, such individuals’ ideal policies may combine repression of liberties
along with low taxes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the baseline model.
Section 3 considers the (joint) preferences of individuals over taxes and liberties. In Section 4 we
analyze the political determination of these policies and show how intolerance affects political
outcomes differently depending on the relative importance of the religious and the productivity
gaps. We also show that the secular elite may in some cases benefit from the spread of reli-
giosity: While religiosity decreases aggregate output, it also induces a lower tax rate. Section
5 concludes. Proofs are relegated to Appendix A. Appendix B contains a simple analysis that
shows that the associations among the key variables (i.e, religiosity, liberties, inequality and
redistribution) implied by the model are corroborated by the data.
2. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY ENVIRONMENT
In this Section we describe the economic environment and the two political variables: the legal
cap on liberties and a simple linear tax rate.
There are two key assumptions that are important for our analysis. First, we need that the
broadening of personal liberties increases the work incentives of the less religious individuals
compared with more religious ones. This can arise in many environments. For example, the
lifting of legal restrictions on women’s access to work, education, and family planning in the
West has benefited secular and moderately religious women. However, highly religious women
were and still are constrained by the restrictions imposed by their religion. The second key as-
sumption is that religious individuals may suffer from negative externalities when others around
them practice liberties that are opposed to their code of conduct. The model we present below is
a simple one that includes these two features.
We consider a model in which individuals are fully characterized by two parameters: their pro-
ductivity at work, w, and their preferred degree of practice of personal liberties ` ∈ [0, 1]. For
simplicity, the two characteristics are uncorrelated. In the following, F (·) denotes the cdf of w,
while G(·) is the cdf of `. Notice that religiosity is inversely related to `: the larger is `, the less
religious the individual is.
Individuals enjoy utility from consumption c and from used personal liberties l, and experience
disutility from effort e and from the social use of liberties, whenever the average level of used
liberties l by all individuals in society, denoted by ¯̀, is above their ideal level, `.
The utility function is as follows:
U(c, l, e) = c
(






e2 − δmax{0, ¯̀− `}.
6
The first element of the utility function measures the valuation of material consumption and of
liberties, with standard complementarity assumptions. The parametric form of the term in paren-
thesis, (1 + l − l22`), has been chosen so as to capture the fact that ` is the ideal level of personal
practice of liberties: utility increases with the use of liberties, l, up to ` and decreases thereafter.
Notice also that because of the assumed complementarity between c and l, the choice of the use
of liberties and the ideal level of liberties determine the marginal utility of consumption. The sec-
ond element of the utility function is a standard specification of the utility cost of effort. The last
element describes the extent to which individuals experience disutility from others consuming
liberties beyond what they consider adequate. The parameter δ ≥ 0 measures the psychological
cost of such externality, which we assume common to all the individuals. Religions that associate
God’s punishments with individual’s behaviour may induce a low δ; religions that associate such
punishments to average behavior in society, may induce a high δ. We sometimes refer to δ as the
degree of intolerance, since individual utility can decrease as a result of the behavior of others.
While the degree of intolerance δ is common to all the population and captures a more general
feature than religion itself, individual religiosity is captured by the parameter `, the level of
personal liberties the individual deems adequate to practice. Our political analysis in Section 4.2
will focus on how intolerance affects political outcomes, while Section 4.3 considers how the
distribution of personal religious beliefs affects political outcomes.
We assume that a legal cap, ˆ̀ ∈ [0, 1], determines the highest level of liberties that individuals
can consume so that l ≤ ˆ̀ The legal cap on liberties has two effects. First, it establishes the
direct limit of what is accessible to individuals. Second, ˆ̀ affects the average level of liberties
used in society: since a share of the population is constrained by ˆ̀, a higher ˆ̀will permit a higher
¯̀. Then, ˆ̀affects the magnitude of negative externalities experienced by individuals.
Individuals maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint and the legal constraint on the
maximum liberties permitted, ˆ̀. Income is subject to a linear tax with a marginal tax rate of t
and a transfer T which is entirely consumed. Hence, c = (1− t)ew + T .
We assume for simplicity that liberties are costless to consume. It is then immediate that indi-









The average use of liberties depends on the legal cap ˆ̀[and the distribution G(·)], and is strictly
increasing in ˆ̀, with
d¯̀
dˆ̀
= 1−G(ˆ̀) > 0.
Let
(2) λ(`, ˆ̀) ≡ 1 + 1
2




, if ` > ˆ̀,
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denote the effect of the personal use of liberties in the utility function. We can then solve for the
optimal effort supply:
(3) e(w, `) = (1− t)wλ(`, ˆ̀)
It follows that labor supply is linearly increasing in ` up to ˆ̀ and is increasing, in a concave
manner in `, thereafter. Consumption is then
c(`, ˆ̀) = (1− t)2w2λ(`, ˆ̀) + T (t, G(.), ˆ̀).
where t is the marginal tax rate and T the associated transfer of a purely redistributive linear
income tax.
A higher valuation of the practice of personal liberties will result therefore in higher effort in-
centives. Thus, religious individuals would be on average poorer than secular ones, everything
else equal. Intuitively, due to complementarities in the utility function, the marginal utility of
consumption is lower for those that like and practice less liberties, inducing a lower effort incen-
tive. It is also easy to see that income inequality would increase when more liberties are legally
allowed. Notice that the last term in the utility function, δmax{0, ¯̀− `}, which captures the
negative externalities experienced from others’ consumption of liberties beyond one’s ideal `,
does not affect labour effort choices.
Other papers have also shown how religiosity may affect labour supply and aggregate output
through individuals investing in non-productive activities such as rituals, or by being limited by
religious restrictions.7 Henceforth our focus will be on the political implications of the above in
terms of the choice of taxation and the choice of the legal cap on liberties.
3. PREFERENCES OVER LIBERTIES AND REDISTRIBUTION
In this section we derive the ideal policies of individuals over t ∈ [0, 1] and the legal cap ˆ̀. As we
will show, it is sometimes the case that more religious individuals prefer repression of liberties
along with low taxes, albeit being poor. In fact, those individuals prefer lower taxes than richer
ones.
To proceed, consider the indirect utility over the political variables: taxation t ∈ [0, 1] and the
legal cap ˆ̀. To this effect, let us compute the average pre-tax income ȳ(ˆ̀). Since individual
pre-tax income is y = we, integrating y over w and `, we obtain






















7See Levy and Razin (2012), Iannaccone (1992), Berman (2000) and the empirical evidence in Barro and Mc-
Cleary (2003).
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The term Λ(ˆ̀) measures the effect of liberties on productivity in society. The higher the use of
liberties, the higher the incentive to exert effort (as consumption is more rewarding). Thus, since
T = tȳ, it follows that
(5) T (t, ˆ̀) = t(1− t)E(w2)Λ(ˆ̀).
Using the previous results we can obtain the indirect utility function in terms of the characteristics
of the individual, (w, `), and the policy parameters, (t, ˆ̀):
(6) u(w, `, t, ˆ̀)) =
1
2
(1− t)2w2λ(`, ˆ̀)2 + t(1− t)E(w2)Λ(ˆ̀)λ(`, ˆ̀)− δmax{0, ¯̀− `}.









ȳ(ˆ̀)− y(w, `, ˆ̀)
]
.
Hence we can obtain the optimal tax for an individual (w, `) to be












Note that t(w, `) ≤ 12 . The preferred tax rate by an individual (w, `) is decreasing in the pro-
ductivity w, as standard, and in `. This is reasonable, as higher valuation for liberties increases
productivity due to complementarities with consumption. Hence, less religious individuals (with
a higher `) are richer and prefer lower taxes, everything else equal. Specifically, whenever the
liberties-adjusted social productivity, E(w2)Λ(ˆ̀), is greater than the personal one, w2λ(`, ˆ̀),
positive taxation will be preferred.
Note that for any given ˆ̀ all individuals with the same income will prefer the same tax rate,
independently of their religiosity and of their productivity. Thus, the above replicates Meltzer
and Richard’s (1982) result. This implies that, for a given ˆ̀, on average, the more religious
will demand higher redistribution because they are poorer. We will see later on that this will not
necessarily be the case when the joint preferences over the legal cap on liberties and redistribution
are considered.
To gain a further insight into the interaction between religiosity and preferences for redistribu-
tion, consider now the effect of a relaxation of the legal cap of liberties on the preferred level of
taxation. Note that if more liberties are permitted, income inequality will increase. This is so
because, while a part of society –those with ` < ˆ̀– are not affected in terms of their personal
income, while that of all above ˆ̀ increase their income.
Consider an individual with ` < ˆ̀. Her preferred level of taxation is increasing in the legal cap ˆ̀,
as this change increases average productivity in society while her own individual income remains
9






Λ(ˆ̀). In other words, while average productivity increases, so does the personal income for
these individuals. For individuals close enough to ˆ̀, personal income does not increase enough
compared with that of society, while for those who value liberties sufficiently, the opposite arises.
We then have:
Lemma 1. There exists `′ > ˆ̀ such that all individuals with ` < `′ increase their preferred tax
level when ˆ̀ increases, and all individuals with ` > `′ decrease their preferred tax level when ˆ̀
increases.
The Lemma implies that if more religious individuals prefer to repress liberties (which may
happen because of the negative externalities), they will also couple this with preferences for
lower taxes.


















































Individuals who are sufficiently pro-liberties, those with ` ≥ ¯̀(1), will prefer the highest level
of liberties allowed in society as there will be no negative externalities in their utility function.
Similarly, when there is no social intolerance, that is, when δ = 0, then each individual’s ideal
policy is maximum liberties (ˆ̀= 1), to enjoy the highest possible productivity in society (along
with her ideal level of redistribution).
When society displays intolerance with respect to others’ actions, (i.e., δ > 0) more religious
individuals with ` < ¯̀(1), face a trade-off. If they increase the legal cap on liberties they increase
output (and can get some of this increase transferred to themselves via their ideal tax), but they
may suffer from negative externalities if ¯̀(ˆ̀) > ` due to intolerance. If δ is not too high, then
the first order condition described above will be satisfied with equality, with the more religious
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individuals choosing ˆ̀ satisfying ¯̀(ˆ̀) > `. As the benefit of individuals from more liberties
beyond ` is through redistribution from the less religious, it is the less productive that would
support more liberties. For example, the sufficiently productive individuals who prefer t = 0
will only lose from liberties beyond the level satisfying ¯̀(ˆ̀) = `.
When intolerance δ is sufficiently high, the more religious individuals will be at a corner solution;
such individuals will rather avoid negative externalities and will settle for ˆ̀ satisfying ¯̀(ˆ̀) = `
(or ˆ̀(`) = ¯̀−1(`)). In this case, the desired cap is such that the average use of liberties equals
the individual’s own preferred liberty choice. This is the highest level of allowed liberties they
can support without suffering the externality cost.
The Proposition below summarizes our analysis on the ideal (t, ˆ̀) as conditioned by the social
level of intolerance δ, where we henceforth assume that g(1) > 0.
Proposition 1. The ideal political choice of (t, ˆ̀) for an individual (w, `) is:
(1) if ` ≥ ¯̀(1) then ˆ̀= 1 and t as in (8);
(2) if ` < ¯̀(1), then ˆ̀(`) satisfies ` ≤ ¯̀(ˆ̀) ≤ ˆ̀(`) < 1. Moreover, there exists a function
δ(w, `), decreasing in w, and increasing in ` for a low enough `, so that:
(a) For individuals (w, `) such that δ(w, `) ≥ δ, the ideal policy consists of ˆ̀satisfying
(9), with ˆ̀(`) > ¯̀−1(`), and t satisfying (8); and
(b) For individuals (w, `) such that δ(w, `) ≤ δ, the ideal policy is ˆ̀ such that there is
no externality cost, that is with ˆ̀(`) satisfying ˆ̀(`) = ¯̀−1(`), and t satisfying (8).
Among the more religious individuals (those with ` < ¯̀(1)), those with a low value of δ(w, `)
are the ones that are more productive. Proposition 1 says that they are the ones that most likely
will prefer a low cap on liberties (bear no psychological cost) because their benefit from a higher
cap -namely more redistribution- is less valued relative to the psychological effect of negative
externalities. Conversely, the individuals that are less productive –hence with a large δ(w, `)–
will prefer a higher cap on liberties, even at the cost of suffering from the externality, because
the benefit of a more generous redistribution exceeds the effect of social intolerance.
We now examine more closely how the preferred policies change with the different individual
characteristics (w, `). We show an important implication of the above: when δ is high enough,
the very religious individuals will prefer lower levels of liberties. As a result, religious individ-
uals might also prefer lower taxes than their more secular counterparts with the same or higher
income. Specifically, total differentiation of the optimisation conditions imply the following
result.
Proposition 2. For all δ > 0, when individuals are sufficiently religious, an increase in religios-
ity (a lower `) results in preferences for a lower cap on liberties ˆ̀; moreover, when δ is sufficiently
large, this also results in a preference for a lower level of taxation. Finally, preferences for taxa-
tion are not monotonic, with very poor individuals preferring lower taxes compared with richer
ones.
It is easier to gain intuition for the case of a high δ. In that case, individuals choose the cap
on liberties so as not to suffer from negative externalities, equating ¯̀(ˆ̀) with their own ideal
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consumption `. As a result, a higher religiosity –a lower `– induces a preference for a lower cap.
With regard to taxes, a more religious individual again has a preference for higher taxation, given
that she exerts relatively little effort compared to the rest of society. However, her preference for
a lower cap implies that others produce less as well, which induces a preference for low taxes.
In other words, a lower cap creates lower inequality in society and, thus, lower taxes are desired.
For individuals with high religiosity, this social incentive of taxation dominates (as can also be
seen from Lemma 1).
Thus for some range of values of w there is non-monotonicity in the preference for taxation with
respect to religiosity. Consider now a fixed value of w. The highly secular individuals prefer full
liberties and low taxes, because of their high income. For an intermediate level of religiosity
individuals will demand lower liberties but their higher level of religiosity (and hence their lower
income) will also imply a demand for a higher tax. However, for the very religious the desired
cap on liberties would be very low together with low taxation, because in a repressed society
–and hence compressed incomes– their income will not be as low relative to the mean.
Our result is consistent with empirical findings showing that religious individuals who are also
poor often prefer low taxes compared with their secular counterparts, and vote accordingly to
right-wing parties, as documented by Huber and Stanig (2007) and De La O and Rodden (2008).
Note that in our model the preference for repression of liberties and modest redistribution is not
driven by the “forced choice” imposed by the political parties choice of policies.
We next turn to the political determination of liberties and taxation. We will show that a similar
effect can arise when we allow for strategic political choices. Specifically, we will show that high
levels of intolerance δ can be associated with repression of liberties and will be accompanied by
lower taxes.
4. VOTING ON REPRESSION AND REDISTRIBUTION
In this section we examine the political choice over the two policies: the cap on liberties ˆ̀, and
taxation t. We consider a simple version of the citizen candidate political model (Osborne and
Slivinski 1996, Besley and Coate 1997).
In order to better capture the forces at work, we focus on a simplified model with four groups.
The groups are obtained as a result of the crossing of two productivity levels, wH and wL,
high and low, and two religiosity levels, {`, 1}, the religious and the secular respectively. The
four groups are then the religious high-productivity agents (RH), the secular high-productivity
agents (SH), the religious low-productivity agents (RL) and the secular low-productivity agents
(SL). We assume that no single group has a majority. We also assume, as standard, that the low
productive workers are in a majority, that is, their share p satisfies p > 12 . We shall denote by πw
the “productivity gap”, πw ≡
w2H
w2L
and by πr the “religious gap”, πr(ˆ̀) ≡ λ(1,
ˆ̀)
λ(`,ˆ̀)
. We denote by σ
the share of the secular population. As we will show, the interaction between these gaps will be
important to determine the political outcome. The two distributions are uncorrelated so that, for
instance, σp is the share of SL, the total population that is secular and with low productivity. We
also assume for simplicity that society has to choose over the two alternative levels of liberties
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deemed adequate by the population ˆ̀ ∈ {`, 1}. Hence, the religious gap can take two values
only: πr(`) =
2+`+`(1−`)
2+` and πr(1) =
3
2+` . When liberties are repressed (
ˆ̀ = `), the religious
gap cannot be too wide, while under full liberties (ˆ̀= 1), the differences in religious preferences
play a role as they possibly induce a substantial gap.
We assume that each type in the population is represented in the political process by one repre-
sentative, a politician, whereas the remaining individuals of each type participate in the election
as voters. For simplicity, there are no costs of running for election or benefits from holding of-
fice. Each representative cares, therefore, only about the political outcome, i.e., the tax rate and
the legal cap on liberties chosen by the political process and commits to her preferred policy. It
follows that politicians decide whether to run or not, knowing that their platform has to reflect
their own ideal policies.
Assume in addition that voters vote sincerely for the platform they like most. As a tie breaking
rule, we assume that any candidate would withdraw if, by doing so, she cannot have an effect on
the set of winning platforms.8 We assume that the default policy is bad enough so that at least
one politician always participates.
4.1. Ideal policies. We first provide the ideal policies of the four groups, which, in line with the
citizen-candidate model, will be the only policies that can arise in equilibrium. Recall that we




















, that is, by the product of
relative productivity and relative secularism, as derived in Proposition 1. The higher these terms
are, the lower the desired tax rate.
Note that for the simple case of four groups, we have that









Ideal policies for each of the groups will be either (1, t(wi, `j , 1)) or (`, t(wi, `j , `)) for i ∈
{L,H}, and j ∈ {S,R}. To simplify notation, let t(wi, `j , 1) ≡ tji(ˆ̀).
From Lemma 1 and the above it is easy to see that: (i) for religious individuals, tRi(`) < tRi(1),
as liberties make them relatively poorer, whereas for secular individuals, tSi(`) > tSi(1), as
liberties make them relatively richer; (ii) as standard, tjL(ˆ̀) > tjH(ˆ̀), so that more productive
individuals demand less taxation, if at all; (iii) tRi(ˆ̀) > tSi(ˆ̀), so that for the same productivity
level, secular individuals demand less taxes than religious ones, as they are richer.
Note that, even in the case of equality in productivities, with w2i = E(w
2), the religious would
support taxation in order to partially offset the effect on income from the incentives the secular
enjoy from individual liberties. It is also easy to see that for SH , tSH(`) = tSH(1) = 0, as they
8This condition further simplifies the analysis by reducing the number of equilibria.
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are always the group with the highest income, while for RL, it must be that tRL(`) > 0, as they
are always the poorest group.
From the above and in accordance with Proposition 1, we have the following:
Lemma 2. The ideal policies for the four groups are as follows
• secular groups Si, i = {L,H}: (1, tSi(1));
• religious groups Ri, i = {L,H}: there exist thresholds δi, with δH < δL, such that the
ideal policies are (1, tRi(1)) when δ < δi, and (`, tRi(`)) when δ > δi.
As in the previous section, the religious face a trade-off between living in a more productive
economy, with higher overall per capita income, but at the cost of negative externalities from
society’s consumption of liberties. Alternatively, they can choose a less productive economy
(hence with lower taxation) in which no such negative externalities exist. As this trade-off is
more pronounced for the less productive, they prefer liberties for a larger range of parameter
values.
4.2. Political outcomes: main results. In this section we provide a characterization of the
citizen-candidate equilibria, and show two main results. First, when the productivity gap is
sufficiently wide, the political process doesn’t need to lead to repression of liberties, even in
relatively intolerant societies (those with moderate values of δ). Second, if the productivity gap
is narrow compared to the religious gap and society exhibits sufficient intolerance, repression
arises and is accompanied by lower taxes compared to those that would result from full liberties.
While there can be many equilibria in the citizen-candidate model, in our environment it will
generically be the case that pure-strategy equilibria will involve one candidate running and win-
ning. Two-candidate (or more) equilibria can only arise when a tie occurs, which, as long as there
are not two groups that constitute exactly half of the population, cannot be the case. Moreover,
whenever there is a one-candidate equilibrium, it will be unique. This is so because, for this
candidate to win, she has to be able to assemble a majority of votes so that no other candidate
can beat her. When a pure-strategy equilibrium fails to exist, a mixed-strategy equilibrium will
involve candidates mixing between running (and offering their ideal policy) and not running.
We start considering first the straightforward case when intolerance is sufficiently low. If δ < δH ,
all individuals in society prefer full liberties. Recall that πr(ˆ̀) ≡ λ(1,
ˆ̀)
λ(`,ˆ̀)
is the religious gap at the
cap ˆ̀, and that πw ≡
w2H
w2L
is the productivity gap. We therefore have:
Proposition 3. When δ < δH the equilibrium political outcome always is with full liberties.
Furthermore,
• if the secular are a majority, then SL runs alone and wins with (1, tSL(1)).
• if the religious are a majority, then
– if πw > πr(1), SL runs alone and wins with (1, tSL(1)) and
– if πw ≤ πr(1), RH runs alone and wins with (1, tRH(1)).
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Intuitively, both RH and SL are candidates for being “median” voters in the sense that they
offer intermediate tax levels. RL always offers the highest tax, while SH offers the lowest tax
tSH = 0. When the secular are the majority, SL can either assemble the support of the secular
coalition, when πw > πr(1), or the support of the low productive agents, when πw < πr(1).
If the religious are the majority, then RL is the crucial group, siding with either SL or RH
depending on whoever promises higher taxes. If the productivity gap is wider than the religiosity
gap, that would be the SL group, otherwise, that would be the RH one.
We have analyzed the case of a low effect for negative externalities, or low intolerance. We
now proceed to examine the case of a higher δ, where individuals have more intolerance towards
others practicing liberties. We start with the case of narrow productivity gap, πw. Since the
differences in productivity are modest, groups are aligned along the religiosity dimensions, the
main social cleavage. We show now that in this case, whenever δ is large enough, repression
arises in equilibrium at least with some probability and sometimes always.
Lemma 3. Suppose that δ > δH and πw < Λ(`)Λ(1)πr(1).
9 Then:
• When the secular are a majority, SL runs alone and wins with (1, tSL(1)).
• When the religious are a majority there is no equilibrium in which SL runs alone and
wins. Specifically, when δ > δL then all equilibria involve repression with a strictly
positive probability. Furthermore, there exists δ′ > δL such that if δ > δ′, repression
arises with probability one.
When δ is large enough, RH starts supporting repression. As the productivity gap is relatively
narrow, the tax level she supports is high enough to allow her to gain the support of RL, even
when the ideal policy of the latter favours full liberties. This means that SL cannot run alone in
equilibrium. When δ is high enough, it is also the case that the interests of the religious groups
are sufficiently aligned, so that neither religious group will vote for SL against the other religious
group. This means that either RL or RH must win in a pure strategy equilibrium (this will be
the group preferred by SL). Figure 2 is instructive in showing the ideal policies; crucially, a
wide religious gap implies that the taxes advocated by the religious under repression are higher
than those advocated by the secular under libertes.10
In the previous section we have shown that there are environments in which the ideal policies
of religious individuals combine repression with lower taxation. Here we show that the political
outcome can satisfy this feature as well when the productivity gap is sufficiently narrow as above:
Remark 1. Consider a religious majority and let πw < min{Λ(1)Λ(`) ,
Λ(`)
Λ(1)πr(1)}. Then, whenever
repression arises in equilibrium (which is the case for a high enough δ), it is combined with
lower taxation than when full liberties arise in equilibrium.
The condition in Remark 1 ensures that tRL(`) ≤ tRH(1). When δ is low enough, then all
equilibria with a religious majority have full liberties and tRH(1). However, when δ > δL,
9It can be shown that Λ(`)
Λ(1)
πr(1) > 1.
10The condition in the Lemma implies that tSL(1) < tRH(`). In Figure 2 it is also the case that tSL(`) < tRH(`)
which implies that for a high δ, RH is the winner of the election gaining support from both SL and RL.
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all equilibria must involve repression. Moreover, whenever repression arises, taxes are lower
than tRH(1). It is either the case that RH wins and then naturally tRH(`) ≤ tRH(1), or that
RL wins with the ideal policy of (`, tRL(`)). Intuitively, whenever there is a religious majority,
the religious candidates always win, due to the aligned interests between the religious groups.
As their preferred tax level is lower under repression, we either observe full liberties and high
taxation, or repression and lower taxation. In other words, as the religious gap is sufficiently
wide, it is the religious groups that stick together and win the election. As for these groups
desired taxation decrease together with less liberties, a higher intolerance implies both repression
and lower taxation.
We now consider the case of a wide productivity gap. As we show, a wider productivity gap
implies that repression may not arise, even when religious individuals are relatively intolerant and
are in the majority. In this case it is more important for the low productive religious individuals
to side with the low productive secular to achieve a large level of redistribution. Thus a “class”
vote arises -when SL and RL support one of their candidates- rather than a “religious” vote
-which arises when RH and RL support each other:
Lemma 4. There exists κ <∞, such that when πw > κπr(1):
• If δH < δ < δL, then SL runs alone and wins with (1, tSL(1)), both when there is a
secular and a religious majority.
• When there is a religious majority, there exists δ′′ so that when δ > δ′′ > δL, then RL
runs alone and wins with (`, tRL(`)).
Again, it is instructive to observe this in a figure. Figure 3 shows the preferred tax rate when the
productivity gap is sufficiently wide. In this case, the low productive secular group offers higher
taxes than the high productive religious group under full liberties:
As a result, a wide productivity gap means that social classes “stick” together. Thus, even when
there is relatively high intolerance, so that δ > δH , class voting persists with RL voting with SL
for liberties, in return for high taxation. In addition, when δ is sufficiently large, the religious
groups are also bound by their dislike for liberties and will vote for their fellow religious group
no matter what tax level they offer. Thus RL enjoys both the support of the low productive
secular group SL, as well as the support of the high productive religious group. The former
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appreciates the high level of tax offered by RL, while the latter appreciates repression. As the
winner switches from SL to RL, repression necessitates higher taxes. This implies that:
Remark 2. Consider a religious majority and let πw be sufficiently large compared with πr.
Then when the degree of intolerance δ increases (from some δ < δL to a high enough δ), the
political outcome switches from liberties and some positive taxation to repression and higher
taxes.
We summarise the key insights from our analysis for the case of a religious majority in the result
below.
Proposition 4. The equilibria of the citizen-candidate vote in the presence of a religious majority
are such that (i) tolerant societies (low δ) are characterised by full liberties while very intoler-
ant societies are characterised by repression. (ii) When the religiosity gap is sufficiently wide
(narrow) compared with the productivity gap, a switch from a tolerant society to a sufficiently
intolerant society, implies a switch from a political outcome of full liberties to that of repression,
and is accommodated by a decrease (increase) in taxation.
The results are consistent with empirical evidence that shows that more religious societies will
be associated with lower taxation.11 We highlight a particular mechanism showing how this can
arise. In our model religious intolerance induces repression of liberties. If it is also the case that
the religious division in society is deep (i.e., society is quite polarized in terms of preferences
over individual consumption of liberties), then such repression also induces lower taxes.
4.3. Comparative statics: religiosity and taxation. We have already shown that large intol-
erance will result in lower taxes when the productivity gap is narrow, and in higher taxes when
the productivity gap is wide, compared to the case of small intolerance. We now examine the
effects on taxes of changes in the parameters of the distribution of religious beliefs: the share of
the seculars, σ, and the degree of religiosity, `.
Let us start by considering the case in which the winning tax rate is tSL(1). This case arises when
secular are a majority or when δ is sufficiently low. Then it is easy to see that the equilibrium tax
is strictly increasing in both ` and σ. Under full liberties, the larger is the share of the secular,
11See for example Scheve and Stasavage (2006).
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the higher is the average income. This reduces the relative income of SL and thus increases the
demand for redistribution. Likewise, an increase in ` will increase the income of the religious
and, hence, the average income in society. Now the relative income of SL has come down and
hence they demand more redistribution.
We now consider the environments in which the winning tax is tRH(1). Specifically, this arises
for a religious majority and low δ, when the productivity gap is narrow compared with the reli-
gious gap. In that case a higher σ increases the demanded tax rate again as average income in
society increases. What happens when ` increases? The demanded tax increases if and only if
∂Λ(1)
∂` λ(`, 1) >
∂λ(`,1)
∂` Λ(1), as both individual income and that of society increases. However,
it is easy to show due to the simple linear structure of Λ(1) and λ(`, 1), that the above does not
hold and hence the demand for taxation decreases.
As we have shown, when δ is large, repression arises, and then RH or RL can win with a policy
of (`, tRi(`)). Again an increase in σ will increase the demand for taxation. However, an increase
in ` will increase the demand for taxation, as above, if ∂Λ(`)∂` λ(`, `) >
∂λ(`,`)
∂` Λ(`). This is in fact
positive for a low enough `, and negative otherwise. Thus if individuals are sufficiently religious,
taxes will increase in religiosity (locally), and otherwise they will decrease.
4.4. Inequality and religiosity: a reverse causality. Does higher religiosity translate into
lower demands for redistribution by the low income population? Solt et al (2011) and Solt (2014)
argue that the direction of causality is the reverse one: inequality breeds religiosity. These papers
argue that, as inequality becomes sufficiently high, the elite has an interest in spreading religious
values among the poor. Indeed, a complementary question to address is whether the elite in
society (the highly productive agents, or possibly the secular productive agents who are on av-
erage richer) can alter economic outcomes and, in particular, lower redistribution by affecting
religiosity. We show below that indeed the secular elites prefer to increase religiosity when the
productivity gap is wide, as this results in lower taxation.
We focus on the case in which the SL are pivotal. Specifically, assume that the seculars are a
majority, and that intolerance is relatively low. In this case, the political outcome is (1, tSL(1)).
What happens when ` increases or when σ decreases? Is it possible that secular groups in society
are interested in increasing religiosity?
To see who gains and who loses, recall the indirect utility of the secular groups under (1, tSL(1)):
u(wi, 1, tSL(1), 1)) =
1
2
(1− tSL(1))2w2i λ(1, 1)2 + tSL(1)(1− tSL(1))E(w2)Λ(1)λ(1, 1).
For SL, there is a clear loss from increasing the intensity of religious feeling, `, as well as the
size of the religious population. As SL is pivotal, the tax level chosen is at her optimum. Thus
any benefit from changes in society will come only through increasing Λ(1). Higher religiosity
only decreases Λ(1) and hence SL will advocate more “secularity”.
However, when we consider SH two effects arise from higher religiosity. Religiosity decreases
Λ(1), which is a loss as above, but also induces SL to choose a lower level of tax. This is
because SL becomes richer relative to aggregate mean income, and thus more aligned with SH .
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Differentiating the indirect utility of the SH with respect to σ we can observe the two effects in
opposite directions:
du(wi, 1, tSL(1), 1))
dσ
= −(1− tSL(1))w2i (λ(1, 1))2 + (1− 2tSL(1))E(w2)Λ(1)λ(1, 1)
+tSL(1)(1− tSL(1))E(w2)Λ(1)λ(1, 1).
The first two effects are (jointly) negative. This simply is the effect on SH’s utility via the
induced increase of t, obviously negative. The last element is positive and results from a higher
average income in society. Plugging in the optimal condition for tSL(1), and re-arranging, we
get that a sufficient condition for the aggregate effect on SH’s utility be negative is that [p is the





6 + p(1− `)
6− (1− p)(1− `)
This condition will insure that a higher σ reduces utility or in other words, that SH prefers
to lower the share of the seculars (as long as the majority is maintained). Intuitively, a higher
productivity gap implies that it is more important for SH to reduce taxation –which SL will do
once religiosity in society is more pronounced– rather than have a more productive population.
We summarize this discussion in the following Remark.
Remark 3. Whenever the political outcome is according to the preferred policy of SL, an in-
crease in ` or σ decreases the utility of SL. On the other hand, SH can benefit from increased
religiosity when the productivity gap is sufficiently wide.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We study the interplay of the economic and religious cleavages in determining the outcome of
the political choice of redistribution and of the extent of liberties. Clearly most religions have
a strong stand on prohibiting some individual activities. This ranges from what should not be
eaten or drunk to who cannot be your partner or what gender is the dominant one. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the first formal analysis of the effect of individual religiosity on the
political choice of the extent of individual liberties together with that of taxation.
We show that the preferences of poor religious individuals for taxation may not follow directly
from their “class” interest. Highly religious individuals will prefer less liberties and as a result,
lower taxes than those demanded by secular individuals with the same or even lower productivity.
We can then rationalize the vote of the religious poor to right-wing parties, without having to
appeal to a “forced choice” imposed by the given platform of the political parties.
We also show how this effect arises at the aggregate level: religious societies may be associated
with low level of liberties and with low level of taxation. However, we show that if the religious
cleavage is not too dominant, even a society with a religious majority may vote for personal
liberties. It is the joint effect of a religious majority and high levels of intolerance that makes
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repression the chosen policy. The implications of the model provide a new theoretical expla-
nation for the existing empirical evidence showing negative correlation between religiosity and
redistribution at the country level. This is also in line with the cross-country correlation plot-
ted in the Introduction showing a negative relationship between religious intensity and the legal
cap on personal liberties. Furthermore, as a first cut, Appendix B provides a first empirical test
of the role of religiosity and liberties, as well as their interaction, in explaining market income
inequality. The results obtained confirm the predictions of the model.
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APPENDIX A
Proof of Lemma 1
From equation (8) it is easy to see that the derivative of t(w, `, ˆ̀) w.r.t. depends on the sign of
∂Λ(ˆ̀)
∂ ˆ̀






is positive and does not depend on `, while ∂λ(`,
ˆ̀)
∂ ˆ̀
≥ 0 and is
strictly increasing in `. Whenever ` ≤ ˆ̀, as ∂λ(`,
ˆ̀)
∂ ˆ̀
= 0, this is strictly positive, whereas when
` = 1 this is strictly negative. Thus there exists `′ > ˆ̀ so that for ` ≤ `′ the preferred taxes
increase and for ` > `′ they decrease.
Proof of Proposition 1
Using (9), it is clear that when ` ≥ ¯̀(1) we have that du(w,`)
dˆ̀
> 0. It follows that all the
individuals with ` ≥ ¯̀(1) choose ˆ̀= 1 and t(w, `, 1).
We now examine the subset of parameter values with ` < ¯̀(1). We first show that in this set




at ˆ̀ = 1 in (9), this derivative is zero. Assuming that g(1) > 0 and taking
the second derivative, we obtain that the indirect utility is locally strictly convex in ˆ̀ if and only
if ` < ¯̀(1). Hence, for the subset of parameter values we are now examining, ˆ̀ = 1 is a local
minimum. We can strengthen this result by showing that the ideal ˆ̀ satisfies ¯̀(ˆ̀) ≥ `. Suppose
that the ideal ˆ̀ is such that ¯̀(ˆ̀) < `. Then, as long as this inequality is satisfied we can strictly
raise the utility using (9) by increasing ˆ̀.12 Therefore, since we have shown that when ` < ¯̀(1))
the ideal ˆ̀has to be an interior maximum, then it has to be that for this subset of parameter values
¯̀(ˆ̀) ≥ `. Notice that this result implies that the ideal cap satisfies 1 > ˆ̀(`) ≥ ¯̀(ˆ̀) ≥ `. Note
that as ` < ˆ̀(`), we have that λ(`, ˆ̀) = 1 + `2 .
If we now evaluate du(w,`,
ˆ̀)
dˆ̀
at ˆ̀ = 0 we find this derivative to be strictly positive. From these
two results we can deduce that the ideal ˆ̀ is interior. Hence, it follows that u is locally concave
at the ideal ˆ̀. This is a property we shall use later on.




≥ E(w2)Λ(ˆ̀) and interior other-
wise. From the utility function it is straightforward to see that whenever the ideal choice involves
t = 0, the preferred ˆ̀(`) satisfies ¯̀(ˆ̀) = `.
We now define δ(w, `) as the level of δ satisfying:








|¯̀−1(`) − δ(1−G(¯̀−1(`)) = 0
This is the value of δ at which, when ˆ̀= ¯̀−1(`), then (9) is satisfied with equality. Taking total
differentiation of (9) with respect to δ and using the concavity of u at the optimal solution, it
12And not decrease it if the optimal t satisfies t = 0 along the way.
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is easy to show that ∂ ˆ̀∂δ > 0. Thus, everything else equal, for all δ ≥ δ(w, `) the solution must
involve the corner solution of ˆ̀= ¯̀−1(`), whereas the solution for a lower δ will have ˆ̀> ¯̀−1(`)
with the two first order conditions, (8) and (9), satisfied with equality. Note moreover that the
higher is w, the lower is the first element above, and hence the lower is δ(w, `). On the other
hand, for the very religious, when increasing `, the first element increases implying that δ(w, `)












































< δ, the condition cannot be satisfied with equality. Thus





, we know that the solution must be a corner solution where
ˆ̀= ¯̀−1(`).
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider first the case of δ < δ(w, `). Performing total differentiation on the two first order
conditions (which hold with equality), with respect to secularism `, bearing in mind that ` ≤ ¯̀<


















< (>)23 , or when t(w,
`
2 ,
ˆ̀) > 14 . Using
the local concavity of u with respect to ˆ̀ at the maximum, we have that for high religiosity
—low `— higher religiosity makes individuals wish more repression, while at lower levels of
religiosity —above the threshold— a marginal increase in religiosity will make individuals to
support a wider cap on liberties. For the case of δ ≥ δ(w, `), the optimal solution satisfies
ˆ̀(`) = ¯̀−1(`), and thus ˆ̀(`) increases with ` for all individuals. Thus when the individual
becomes more religious, she supports more repression.
We now consider the effect on the preferred taxes when δ ≥ δ(w, `). Now note that for the same
`, t(w, `) increases in ˆ̀but also decreases in `. Thus the effect on t is ambiguous. We hence use





































































































Suppose that ` → 0, so must have ˆ̀ → 0 with normally behaved distribution with no atom
around 0. This implies that the above converges to 12 . This implies that for a low enough `,
higher ` implies higher ˆ̀ and higher taxes, while more religiosity (lower ˆ̀) will imply lower ˆ̀
and lower taxes, as the result states.





λ(`,`) , then tSL(1) < tRH(`). When the secular are in the majority, then SH
prefers the ideal policy of SL to that of RH . Since δ > δH , we know by Lemma 2 that RH’s
preferred policies are (`, tRH(`). Hence, by supporting SL the SH can obtain liberties and lower
taxation. Thus SL must win.
We now proceed to analyze the political outcome when the religious are the majority. We first
show that when δ > δH , RL prefer (`, tRH(`)) to (1, tSL(1)). To see why, note that when
RH prefers repression, she must prefer (`, tRH(`)) to (1, tRH(`)). But for the same taxes, the





)(Λ(1)− Λ(`)) < δσ(1− `).
As personal productivity is not relevant, the above implies that also RL prefers (`, tRH(`))
to (1, tRH(`)). As she also prefers (1, tRH(`)) to (1, tSL(1)) because tSL(1) < tRH(`) <
tRL(`) < tRL(1), then she prefers (`, tRH(`)) to (1, tSL(1)).
From the above we can deduce the following. When the religious are the majority and δ > δH ,
there is no equilibrium in which SL runs alone and wins. If this were the case, then RH can
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deviate and run against her. In this case RH will assemble both her own voters and that of
RL, a majority. Naturally, SH cannot run alone and win as then RH can also win against her.
All the above implies that either RL or RH must win at least with some positive probability
in equilibrium. As when δ > δL the ideal policy of each involves repression, we have that
repression arises with a positive probability.13
Finally, let δ be large enough, so that both the ideal policy of RL is (`, tRL(`)) and, crucially,
RH prefers (`, tRL(`)) to (1, tSL(1)). From the claim above also RL prefers the ideal policy
of RH to that of SL so that each religious group prefers the ideal policy of the other religious
group to that of SL. This means that whoever is preferred by SL is then the median voter and
can run and win. For example, if SL prefers (`, tRL(`)) to (`, tRH(`)) then RL wins against
RH as well as against SL. If on the other hand SL prefers (`, tRH(`)) to (`, tRL(`)) then RH
will win as it wins against RL as well as against SL. Thus one of the religious candidates runs
alone and wins, and repression arises with probability 1.
Proof of Lemma 4
A sufficiently high productivity gap will imply: (i) when δ < δL, then RL prefer the ideal
policy of SL to (`, tRH(`)). (ii) SL prefers `, tRL(`) to `, tRH(`); (iii) RH prefers 1, tSL(1) to
1, tRL(1). Fix wL, and consider a sequence of high productivity wH , satisfying wH → ∞. In






2 , with tRL(`) > tSL(`), tRL(1) >
tSL(1), tRH(`) = tRH(1) = 0, and tRL(`) > tSL(`) > tSL(1) along the sequence. In this limit
case it is easy to see that (i)-(iii) are satisfied. We can therefore find a sufficiently high level of
the (finite) productivity gap so that the above is satisfied. As a result, when δ < δL, from the
above (i) to (iii), SL is the median voter and wins, for any type of majority, secular or religious.
What δ is sufficiently high on the other hand, we have that a religious majority will choose RL
as SL prefers it to RH given the high productivity gap, and RH prefers it to SL given the high
intolerance. Specifically, for each fixed large π, one can find δ large enough so that RH prefers
(`, tRL(`)) to (1, tSL(1)).
13For RH to win with probability 1, it must be that SL prefers her to RL. For RL to win with probablity 1, it
must be that SL prefers her to RH and that RH prefers her to SL. If none of these cases arises, then we will have a
mixed strategy equilibrium with possibly RL, RH and SL all running with some positive probability.
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APPENDIX B
This Appendix presents some graphs aiming to illustrate empirically the aggregate implications
of our model.14 Figure 1 in the main text plots the relationship between the Liberties Index
and religious intensity. The Liberties Index captures the legal evolution of the legislation on
abortion, divorce, women’s rights, LGBT rights and euthanasia, and is assembled from various
sources such as the UN, the EU parliament, World Bank, the Human Rights project, Pew Re-
search Center, Freedom to Marry, etc., see Esteban, Levy and Mayoral (2017) for details on its
construction. Religious intensity is the country-wave average of an individual index of religious
intensity computed using the 6 waves of the European Social Surveys (ESS), i.e., 2002, 2004,
2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012, see also Esteban, Levy and Mayoral (2017) for details.
As mentioned in the main text, our results imply that market income inequality and redistribu-
tion negatively depend on religiosity. Figure 2 depicts the within-country correlation (i.e., net
of country fixed effects) between average religious intensity and market Gini (panel a) and re-
distribution (panel b). Inequality data comes from Solt (2009, 2014), who provides standardized
data on market and disposable Gini coefficients. The degree of redistribution, R, is defined as
R = 1− GdGm , whereGd andGm are Gini of disposable and market incomes, respectively. Despite
the fact that the time span is quite limited and that these variables are likely to move slowly over
time, we still observe a within-country correlation that is negative and around -.2 in both cases.
Not surprisingly, cross-sectional correlations are considerably higher, particularly that between
religious intensity and redistibution, which equals -.47.
Our model also implies that there exists a positive association between liberties and income in-
equality and redistribution, as liberties have an opposite effect on the willingness to work for
secular and religious individuals, which in turn leads to higher income inequality and redistribu-
tive pressures. Figure 3 displays the (within-country) association between the Liberties Index
and inequality (panel a) and redistribution (panel b). Countries included are the same as in Fig-
ure 2 and the time period now is 1960-2013.15 As predicted by our model, we observe a positive
and strong correlation between these pairs of variables.
14The countries considered in this analysis are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.
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Figure 3. INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION AND LIBERTIES
